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MUDDYING THE WATERS:
THE NEED FOR MORE CLARITY
UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Georgia D. Reid†
1

“Men of science, like men of state have a duty imposed by ethics.
The Earth is living: it can and will avenge itself: already there
are portents. The Earth has no time left for man’s ignorance,
arrogance, sophistry and madness.” — Jean Malaurie
INTRODUCTION
Imagine it is your honeymoon, and you are spending it in
Hawaii, by all accounts a veritable paradise on Earth, replete with
tropical flora, exotic wildlife, and warm beaches. You decide to
spend a day at a Kahekili Beach on Maui, swimming, snorkeling,
and looking at beautiful fish and coral reefs. Now, imagine if a few
miles away, a county-run sewage processing plant in Maui discharges three to five million gallons of treated sewage into four on-site
injection wells every day. The effluent then travels into a shallow
groundwater aquifer and ends up in the Pacific Ocean. In fact, it is
polluting the very beach where you are swimming and enjoying
your vacation. The sewage plant does not have a permit to do this,
the consequence of no regulation by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) of the effluent entering the ocean.

†

J.D., May 2021, Touro Law Center.
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This is not an imaginary scenario.1 In 2012, four non-profit
environmental and wildlife groups sued the County of Maui, which
operates the sewage treatment plant.2 The District Court in Hawaii
Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui agreed with the plaintiffs that the
County required a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit when it discharged pollutants from a point source3
which ended up in navigable waters, in this case, the Pacific Ocean.4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed,5
and the County of Maui petitioned an appeal to the Supreme Court.6
NPDES permits issued pursuant to the Clean Water Act
(CWA or the Act) impose limitations on the discharge of pollutants
and establish related monitoring and reporting requirements, in order

1

See Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui (Haw. Wildlife Fund I), 24 F. Supp.
3d 980, 983-84 (D. Haw. 2014), aff’d 881 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 2018), aff’d 886 F.3d
737 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020) (The County of Maui
operates the LWRF, a wastewater treatment facility approximately three miles
north of the town of Lahaina on the island of Maui. The injection wells are long
pipes into which effluent is pumped. The effluent then travels approximately 200
feet underground into a shallow groundwater aquifer beneath the facility. While
“the precise depth of this aquifer fluctuates somewhat, depending on water inputs
and other conditions,” it contains “a sufficient quantity of groundwater to supply a
public water system.” The LWRF typically discharges three to five million gallons
of effluent into the four injection wells on a daily basis.).
2
Plaintiffs are: Hawaii Wildlife Fund, a Hawaii non-profit corporation; Sierra
Club-Maui Group, a non-profit corporation; Surfrider Foundation, a non-profit
corporation; and West Maui Preservation Association, a Hawaii non-profit
corporation. Id. at 983.
3
Id. The Clean Water Act defines a “point source” as “any discernible, confined
and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel,
tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, [or] container.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
4
Environmental organizations brought action against county, alleging that county
violated the Clean Water Act (CWA) by discharging effluent, without a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, at four injection wells.
Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 980.
5
Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui (Haw. Wildlife Fund III), 886 F.3d 737,
742 (9th Cir. 2018).
6
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund (Haw.
Wildlife Fund V), 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020) (No. 18-260), 2018 WL 4205010.
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to improve the cleanliness and safety of the nation’s waters.7 The
issue in the Hawaii Wildlife Fund case, and the many cases decided
before it, was whether liability is defeated—and no permit is
required—when the pollutants make a short trip through groundwater, which is not water currently under the purview of the CWA.8
The scope of the CWA is limited to “Waters of the United
States” (WOTUS), a term that has been redefined by many administrations, which causes confusion in the lower courts when determining the definition of WOTUS. The Obama Administration defined
WOTUS to include wetlands, ephemeral streams, and all navigable
surface waters.9 The Trump Administration eliminated wetlands
(unless the wetland in question has a “significant nexus”10 to
navigable waters), and also removed groundwater, many ditches,
prior converted cropland, and waste treatment systems from the
scope of the Act.11
There is a circuit split among lower courts about how to
interpret the issue of liability when pollutants travel through groundwater and whether the CWA’s jurisdiction can reach hydrologically

7

33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)–(b).
It is not disputed that the effluent being discharged at the LWRF constitutes a
pollutant that is being discharged from a point source. The only area of dispute
between the parties is whether the discharge into the aquifer beneath the facility
constitutes a discharge into “navigable waters.” Haw. Wildlife Fund I, 24 F. Supp.
3d at 989.
9
The Obama Era “Clean Water Rule” regulation defined the scope of federal
water protection in a more consistent manner, particularly over streams and
wetlands which have a significant hydrological and ecological connection to
traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, and territorial seas. Clean Water
Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29,
2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122,
230, 232, 300, 302, and 401).
10
See infra note 22.
11
See The Navigable Waters Protection Rule (Step Two) – Revise, EPA, https://
www.epa.gov/nwpr/navigable-waters-protection-rule-step-two-revise [https://web.
archive.org/web/20200429032203/https://www.epa.gov/nwpr/navigable-watersprotection-rule-step-two-revise] (last visited May 15, 2020).
8
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connected groundwater.12 It is the Sixth Circuit’s stance that liability
is avoided and no permit is required.13 However, the Second, Fourth
and Ninth Circuits have held that a trip through groundwater should
not allow a discharger of a pollutant to avoid CWA liability.14 The
Sixth Circuit’s position that a trip through groundwater defeats
liability under the CWA is an illogical loophole that allows polluters
to avoid liability and to avoid obtaining NPDES permits.
The circuit split and the constant redefining of “WOTUS” by
different administrations is a problem that has confused courts for
decades.15 When defendants in County. of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii
Wildlife Fund petitioned for appeal, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in February of 2019, and environmentalists hoped the
Court would rule that a trip through groundwater does not defeat
CWA liability.16 The stakes were very high for the future of environmental health for America’s waters.
On April 23, 2020, in a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court
decided in favor of the environmental groups, but the confusion that

12

Compare, e.g., Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 399 F.3d
486, 514–15, 520 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that CWA jurisdiction exists over
discharges of pollutants to groundwater that is hydrologically connected to
navigable waters), and Haw. Wildlife Fund I, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 996 (same), with
Cape Fear River Watch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Progress, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 798,
810 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (concluding regulatory authority under CWA does not
extend to groundwater regardless of whether groundwater is eventually or
somehow hydrologically connected to navigable surface water).
13
See, e.g., Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth. (Tenn. Clean
Water Network II), 905 F.3d 436, 448 (6th Cir. 2018).
14
See infra text accompanying note 20.
15
In his dissent in Tennessee Clean Water Network II, Judge Clay questioned the
issue when we wrote, “can a polluter escape liability under the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387, by moving its drainage pipes a few feet from
the riverbank? The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have said no. In two cases today, the
majority says yes.” Tenn. Clean Water Network II, 905 F.3d at 448 (Clay, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
16
County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund (Haw. Wildlife Fund IV), 139 S. Ct.
1164 (2019).
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has resulted in the circuit split may still remain.17 The Hawaii
decision is not comprehensive enough and does not offer enough
guidance to lower courts, and it will allow lower courts to apply
faulty logic and poor environmental policies as they see fit. The
door is still wide open to countless more lawsuits from environmental groups, as well as certain environmentally friendly states.18
This Article argues the CWA needs to be amended in favor of
environmentalism and clarity to minimize litigation and ensure
healthy waters for the nation.
Part I briefly overviews the legislative history of the CWA to
show the intent of Congress when they wrote the CWA. Part II
examines the historic, 2006, Rapanos v. United States case; the last
time the Supreme Court interpreted the intent of the CWA, adding a
“significant nexus test” to determine what kind of wetlands fall
under the purview of the Act.19 Part III analyzes the circuit split
between the Sixth Circuit (holding that a trip through groundwater
defeats CWA liability) and the Fourth and Ninth Circuits (which
hold that a trip through groundwater does not defeat liability).20 Part
IV argues that the best way to guide the courts, and the best way to
17

The Court’s decision was based on a “functional equivalent” theory, which
states: “[T]he statutory provisions at issue require a permit if the addition of the
pollutants through groundwater is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge
from the point source into navigable waters.” County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife
Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468 (2020).
18
The CWA’s citizen-suit provision provides that “any citizen may commence a
civil action . . . against any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of . . . an
effluent standard or limitation under this chapter.” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
19
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006) (plurality opinion) (Holding
that only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are
waters of the United States, pursuant to the Clean Water Act, in their own right, so
that there is no clear demarcation between “waters” and wetlands, are adjacent to
such waters and covered by the Act; wetlands with only an intermittent, physically
remote hydrologic connection to waters of the United States lack the necessary
connection to covered waters to establish the significant nexus required for
coverage under the Act.)
20
Both the Fourth and Ninth circuits determined that a short journey through
groundwater does not defeat CWA liability; the Sixth circuit held that a trip
through groundwater does defeat CWA liability.
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protect the nation’s waters, is by applying the hydrological connection theory and amending the CWA to cover more waters. Part V
examines the recent Supreme Court decision in Hawaii Wildlife
Fund that uses a functional equivalent theory and discusses the
repercussions of the decision. Part VI concludes that, for the sake of
our waters and planet, the CWA should be amended to include a
bright line rule in favor of a more environmentally sound, clear
guide, to deter pollution and minimize future litigation.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Today, the CWA governs pollutants that enter navigable
waters from a point source.21 When pollution comes “from” a point
source and goes “into” navigable waters, the discharger of the pollution must, under the Act, obtain a NPDES permit.22 If the discharger
eliminates pollutants into navigable waters without the NPDES
permit, then the discharger is strictly liable under CWA.23 The
CWA imposes criminal liability, as well as steep civil fines, on a
broad range of industrial and commercial activities.24
Under the CWA as it currently stands, while navigable
waters fall under the purview of the EPA, groundwater remains the
jurisdiction of the states.25 An unpermitted discharge into the
groundwater, therefore, does not constitute a violation of the
21

The term “discharge of a pollutant” and the term “discharge of pollutants” each
means “(A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source, (B) any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or
the ocean from any point source other than a vessel or other floating craft.” 33
U.S.C. § 1362(12).
22
33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)–(b).
23
The Clean Water Act (CWA) creates a strict liability scheme that categorically
prohibits any discharge of a pollutant from a point source without a permit,
irrespective of whether that discharge affects the receiving water. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a).
24
See, e.g., Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715.
25
“It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to
plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
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CWA.26 Groundwater is generally defined as water “in any form in
the ground, including water seeping in soil and rock formations and
naturally occurring subsurface bodies of water.”27 Because groundwater is hydrologically connected to navigable waters, when a
pollutant travels through groundwater, jurisdictional lines are
blurred.28 This blurriness and lack of clear aquatic boundaries confuses lower courts when interpreting CWA liability, because it is
often unclear where pollution in water begins and ends.29 Courts
often look to legislative intent for guidance, but this currently is
leading to a circuit split.
The legislative history of the CWA is one that shows a steady
progression to allow increased federal jurisdiction over the protection
of the nation’s waters.30 The CWA, enacted in 1972, was designed to
protect navigable waters31 from the discharge of pollution. It gave the
newly formed EPA the authority to regulate pollution. Prior to the
enactment of the CWA, regulation of water pollution sat squarely

26

33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
Groundwater, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Stephen
Michael Sheppard ed., Desk ed. 2012).
28
“Hydrological connectivity defines the spatial and temporal pattern of the links
among surface or subsurface water networks flowing across a landscape, and
hence, it determines the ease with which water may move across a landscape or
through a river system.” S.M. Reaney, Hydrological Connectivity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GEOGRAPHY 1512, 1512 (Barney Warf ed., 2010).
29
“Surface water and groundwater systems are connected in most landscapes. . . .
The movement of water between groundwater and surface-water systems leads to
the mixing of their water qualities. High quantities of nutrients or other dissolved
chemicals in surface water can be transferred to the connected groundwater
system.” How Do Groundwater and Surface Water Interact?, AGI, https://www.
americangeosciences.org/critical-issues/faq/how-do-groundwater-and-surfacewater-interact (last visited May 15, 2020).
30
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was enacted in 1948, but was reorganized and expanded in 1972 to become the “Clean Water Act.” Summary of the
Clean Water Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-cleanwater-act (last visited May 15, 2020).
31
Id.
27
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with the states.32 In 1971, Senate Report 414 examined the history of
regulating water pollution in the nation.33 It reads:
For more than two decades, Federal legislation in the
field of water pollution control has been keyed
primarily to an important principle of public policy:
The States shall lead the national effort to prevent,
control and abate water pollution. As a corollary, the
Federal role has been limited to support of, and assistance to, the States.34
As time progressed and industry started to expand, legislation called
for “increased cooperation between the Federal government and the
States,” and in 1956 Congress approved the “first major legislative
changes in the water pollution control program” by giving federal
grants to the states, but the funding “fell short.”35 In 1965, Congress
added another layer of federal regulation:
Each State was required by the 1965 Act to develop
standards for water quality within its boundaries.
These standards were to be applied to all interstate
navigable waters flowing through the State; intrastate
waters were not included. The State standards were
to be submitted to the new Federal agency by July 1,
1967, for approval.36

32

S. REP. No. 92-414 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3669.
Id.
34
This report references legislation from 1948, 1956, and 1965. Historically, the
states governed the prevention of water pollution, and the federal government
acted to assist them when needed. As history progressed, the need for federal
assistance increased. The 1948 legislation “assigned powers for enforcement in
water pollution control to Governors of the States.” Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
33
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The federal agency at the time was the Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration, located in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. In 1970, the authority was transferred to the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.37 Managing
water pollution was getting complicated, and the need for a centralized, federal enforcement of protecting the nation’s waters was
required.38 The 1971 Senate Report mentions many problems in
water pollution control at the time, including cleaning up oil discharges, discharge of hazardous substances, discharge of sewage,
cleaning up pollution in the Great Lakes, acid mine drainage, regulation of federal activities affecting water quality, and manpower
training for water pollution control.39
At hearings held in 1971, the Committee on Air and Water
Pollution concluded that “the national effort to abate and control
water pollution has been inadequate in every vital aspect.”40 The
Committee proposed “a major change in the enforcement mechanism of the federal water pollution control program from water
quality standards to effluent limits.”41
The pollution in America was extreme at the time the CWA
was finally implemented; for example, fires were nothing out of the
ordinary on Cleveland’s Cuyahoga River.42 Industry spilled chemicals, oil, solvents, and industrial products wherever was convenient;
municipalities used local rivers to dump waste.43 “The dawning of
environmental consciousness in the United States during the 1960s
led to a national commitment to clean air and water with the creation, in 1970, of the Environmental Protection Agency,” writes

37

Id.
Id.
39
Id. at 3670.
40
Id. at 3674.
41
Id. at 3675.
42
Erin Blakemore, The Shocking River Fire That Fueled the Creation of the EPA,
HISTORY, https://www.history.com/news/epa-earth-day-cleveland-cuyahoga-riverfire-clean-water-act (Dec. 1, 2020).
43
Id.
38
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journalist Jim Dwyer.44 The pollution levels were catastrophic, and
attracted media attention. The 1969 Cuyahoga River fire awed the
nation.45 This disaster was followed by the massive Santa Barbara
oil spill in 1969, which dumped 100,000 barrels of crude oil into the
ocean, killing wildlife and washing ashore, destroying beaches.46
The American public realized the critical need for change, and they
made their voices heard with a new environmental movement.47
The intent of the CWA was to find a solution to address the
extreme levels of water pollution at the time.48 The Congressional
declaration of goals and policy section of the Act states, “the
objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”49 This
44

Jim Dwyer, Remembering a City Where the Smog Could Kill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/nyregion/new-york-city-smog.
html.
45
“On June 22, 1969, around 12pm, floating pieces of oil slicked debris were
ignited on the river by sparks caused by a passing train. . . . The Cuyahoga River
was once one of the most polluted rivers in the United States as represented by the
multitude of times it has caught fire, a recorded number of thirteen starting in
1868.” Cuyahoga River Fire, OHIO HIST. CONNECTION, https://www.ohiohistory
central.org/w/Cuyahoga_River_Fire (last visited May 15, 2020).
46
Michigan in the World and the Environmental Justice History Lab, “Environmental Crisis” in the Late 1960s, GIVE EARTH A CHANCE: ENV’T ACTIVISM IN
MICH., http://www.michiganintheworld.history.lsa.umich.edu/environmentalism/
exhibits/show/main_exhibit/origins/-environmental-crisis--in-the- (last visited
May 15, 2020).
47
“During the 1960s, environmentalism became a mass social movement.
Drawing on a culture of political activism inspired in part by the civil rights and
antiwar movements, thousands of citizens, particularly young middle-class white
men and women, became involved with environmental politics.” Environmental
Movement, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia.com/earth-and-envir
onment/ecology-and-environmentalism/environmental-studies/environmentalmovement (May 18, 2020).
48
The CWA defines “pollutant” as “dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator,
sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials,
radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt
and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.” 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251(a), 1362(6).
49
33 U.S.C. § 1251.
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included requiring a permit for the “discharge of a pollutant,”
defined broadly to include any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source.50 The Act gives the Administrator of
the EPA (the “Administrator”) the power to administer Congress’
goals and policy.51
The CWA states “it is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of
States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources.”52 The independence and
authority of the states regarding land use pertaining to groundwater
and wetlands remained intact.53 The attempt to balance both the
federal and state powers to monitor water resources has led to
confusion, especially since water is connected and flows between
navigable water and groundwater, and between states.54 Both the
Obama Administration and the Trump Administration recently
attempted to re-define WOTUS and to address the question of
whether groundwater ever falls under the purview of the CWA.
In 2015, in an attempt to expand protection and provide a
uniform interpretation of the CWA, EPA and the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers finalized the Clean Water Rule (CWR).55 The purpose
of the CWR was to protect all streams and all wetlands, including
effluent streams, in order to ensure the health and safety of all of the
nation’s water resources.56 In a press release about the CWR,
50

33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
33 U.S.C. § 1251.
52
Id.
53
“It is the further policy of Congress that nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water which have been
established by any State. Federal agencies shall co-operate with State and local
agencies . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
54
See supra text accompanying note 11.
55
Definition of “Waters of the United States” – Recodification of Pre-Existing
Rules, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/nwpr/definition-waters-united-states-recodifi
cation-pre-existing-rules (last visited May 15, 2020).
56
What the Clean Water Rule Does, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/cleanwater
rule/what-clean-water-rule-does/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20170329224512/
51
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President Obama announced his executive order in support of the
rule. 57 Obama notably stated that one in three Americans obtained
their drinking water from streams lacking “clear protection,” and
“businesses and industries that depend on clean water face uncertainty and delay.”58 In finalizing the rule, the EPA and the Army
Corps of Engineers “utilized the latest science . . . which showed
that small streams and wetlands play an integral role in the health of
larger downstream water bodies.”59 The Obama administration was
attempting to clarify the federal jurisdiction of the CWA under the
“Clean Water Rule” in a way that took a “better safe than sorry”
approach.60 This change in regulation came in 2015, months after
the Flint Water Crisis of 2014 that devasted so many human lives.61
There was no doubt that pollution was seeping into the public’s
drinking water, and something had to change.62
With his own executive order in 2017, Trump rolled back
the Obama-era CWR.63 The Trump administration replaced the
https://www.epa.gov/cleanwaterrule/what-clean-water-rule-does/] (last visited
May 15, 2020).
57
Coral Davenport, Obama Announces New Rule Limiting Water Pollution, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/28/us/obama-epa-cleanwater-pollution.html.
58
Id.
59
See Definition of “Waters of the United States” – Recodification of Pre-Existing
Rules, supra note 57.
60
“Obama’s EPA first completed a comprehensive study on watershed health and
connectivity and checked its work with panels of the most significant experts in all
fields related to water from biology to geology to hydrology. . . . Environmentalists generally received the Clean Water Rule as a step in the right direction.” Rebecca Bowe, What the Trump Administration Is Doing to Your Water
(Apr. 21, 2020), https://earthjustice.org/blog/2019-october/what-the-trumpadministration-is-doing-to-your-water.
61
Merrit Kennedy, Lead-Laced Water in Flint: A Step-By-Step Look at the
Makings of a Crisis, NPR (Apr. 20, 2016, 6:39 PM), www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2016/04/20/465545378/lead-laced-water-in-flint-a-step-by-step-lookat-the-makings-of-a-crisis.
62
Id.
63
A press release from the Trump Administration reads: “[On January 23, 2020],
at an event at the National Association of Home Builders International Builders’
Show in Las Vegas, EPA Administrator Andrew Wheeler and Assistant Secretary
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CWR with what many environmentalists call the “Dirty Water
Rule.”64 In April of 2019, Trump’s EPA issued an “Interpretative
Statement” addressing whether liability under the CWA is defeated
if pollutants travel through groundwater.65 The Agency declared that
the CWA does not require a discharger to obtain an NPDES permit
if pollutants make a trip through groundwater before reaching navigable waters.66 This interpretation might support industry under
deregulation, but it ravages the environment.67
To assume that discharges of pollutants that go into groundwater
will not somehow reach navigable water is illogical.68 Groundwater

of the Army for Civil Works R.D. James announced a new, clear definition for
‘waters of the United States.’ With the Navigable Waters Protection Rule, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of the Army (Army)
are delivering on President Trump’s promise to finalize a revised definition for
‘waters of the United States’ that protects the nation’s navigable waters from
pollution and will result in economic growth across the country.” EPA and Army
Deliver on President Trump’s Promise to Issue the Navigable Waters Protection
Rule—A New Definition of WOTUS, EPA (Jan. 23, 2020), www.epa.gov/news
releases/epa-and-army-deliver-president-trumps-promise-issue-navigable-watersprotection-rule-0.
64
See Kennedy, supra note 64.
65
Interpretive Statement on Application of the Clean Water Act National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System Program to Releases of Pollutants from a Point
Source to Groundwater, 84 Fed. Reg. 16,810 (Apr. 23, 2019) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 122).
66
See Definition of “Waters of the United States” – Recodification of Pre-Existing
Rules, supra note 57.
67
“Repealing the Clean Water Rule without any valid scientific or legal support
moves this country away from a commonsense safeguard that helps state and
federal agencies protect our rivers, streams, and wetlands under the Clean Water
Act. Everyone is downstream from someone, and this move will ensure that we
can no longer count on U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to protect water
flowing into our neighborhoods, communities, and states from polluters.” Charles
O’Rear, What the Trump Administration Is Doing to Your Water, LAPTRINHX
(Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.laptrinhx.com/what-the-trump-administration-isdoing-to-your-water-1708679476.
68
Groundwater is often a source of surface water, and the hydrological connections between these types of waterbodies allow pollution to migrate from groundwater to surface water. Kathrine Klaus, Note, The Conduit Theory: Protecting
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is present in virtually all landscapes, and connects hydrologically to
streams, wetlands, and navigable waters.69 Courts have been divided
on the issue of how to interpret the jurisdiction of pollutants that
make a trip through groundwater and end up in navigable waters,
resulting in a circuit split among federal district courts.
II. A SUMMARY OF THE PLURALITY DECISION IN RAPANOS
THAT EXPANDED THE INTERPRETATION OF THE SCOPE
OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Until Hawaii Wildlife Fund was decided in 2020, the last
time the Supreme Court took up a case that considered what kind of
waters are under the purview of the CWA was in 2006, in Rapanos
v. United States.70 The question before the court, specifically, was
whether wetlands near ditches or man-made drains that eventually
emptied into traditional navigable waters are under the jurisdiction
of the CWA.71 While the case differs factually from Hawaii Wildlife
Fund, it is important to look at how the court interpreted the intent
of Congress when drafting the CWA. Rapanos also introduced the
“significant nexus test,” which is similar in some regards to the
hydrological connection theory, because it states that waters are connected.72
In Rapanos, the Supreme Court considered the kinds of
connected waters covered by the CWA.73 Rapanos involved two

Navigable Waters from Discharges to Tributary Groundwater, 43 VT. L. REV.
871, 872 (2019).
69
“The interaction of groundwater with surface water depends on the physiographic and climatic setting of the landscape. For example, a stream in a wet climate
might receive groundwater inflow, but a stream in an identical physiographic
setting in an arid climate might lose water to groundwater.” Natural Processes of
Ground-Water and Surface-Water Interaction, USGS, https://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/
circ1139/htdocs/natural_processes_of_ground.htm (Nov. 23, 2016, 12:02:53 PM).
70
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opinion).
71
Id. at 719–21.
72
Id. at 726.
73
Id. at 729.
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Michigan cases which questioned the CWA’s scope.”74 In the first
case, a federal district court found that the wetlands were within
federal jurisdiction because the wetlands were adjacent to navigable
waters; and held the defendants (John A. Rapanos, and others, who
had deposited fill material without a permit into the wetlands) liable
for violations of the CWA.75 On appeal, the district court also ruled
that there was federal jurisdiction, on the basis that the wetland was
adjacent to neighboring tributaries of navigable waters, and had a
“significant nexus” to waters of the United States.76
The United States Supreme Court Justices vacated the Court
of Appeals’ judgments, remanding the cases for further proceeding.77 Justice Scalia announced the plurality judgment of the court,
holding that the term “navigable waters,” under CWA, includes only
“relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water,” not
intermittent or ephemeral flows of water, and that only “those
wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are
‘waters of the United States’ in their own right are ‘adjacent to’ such
waters and covered by the [CWA].”78 However, Scalia also noted
that “the Act does not forbid the ‘addition of any pollutant directly
to navigable waters from any point source,’ but rather the ‘addition
of any pollutant to navigable waters.’”79 Accordingly, he observed
that federal courts consistently have held that a discharge of a
pollutant “that naturally washes downstream likely violates §
1311(a).”80
Justices Scalia, Roberts, Tomas, and Alito were of the view
that the § 1362(7) phrase, “the waters of the United States”
(WOTUS), could not “bear the expansive meaning that the Corps
would give [the phrase].”81 These four Justices wrote that WOTUS
74

Id.
Id. at 721.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 757.
78
Id. at 732–33, 742.
79
Id. at 743 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)).
80
Id.
81
Id. at 731–32.
75
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only includes “relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of
water,” and does not include channels through which water flows
intermittently or ephemerally.82 This does not explicitly reject the
theory that pollution flowing from a point source and then through
groundwater defeats CWA liability.
Justice Scalia made a statement in Rapanos that supported a
hydrological connection theory when he examines the language of
the Act itself.83 Scalia is well known for relying on the plain meaning of a statute.84 Scalia wrote “the CWA does not forbid the ‘addition of any pollutant directly to navigable waters from any point
source,’ but rather the addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters’.”85 Scalia showed here that the statute did not include the
word “directly” for a reason, and that it forbids the addition of a
pollutant to navigable waters in general. This interpretation supports
liability for discharging a pollutant that goes to navigable waters.
Scalia also wrote that the “CWA itself categorizes the channels and
conduits that typically carry intermittent flows of water separately
from ‘navigable waters,’ by including them in the definition of
‘point sources.’”86 However, Scalia failed to write about whether a
trip from a point source, through groundwater, and then to navigable
waters defeats liability. There is no guidance in the CWA about this.
It must be interpreted, and without guidance from the Supreme
Court, lower courts are still grappling with this issue today.
Justice Kennedy, joining Scalia in the plurality, added a
“significant nexus” test to the opinion. This means that in order to
82

Id. at 732–33.
See id. at 743.
84
“Since his elevation to the Supreme Court . . . Scalia has aggressively challenged the Court’s approach to statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia has harshly
criticized the Court’s reliance on legislative history as an aid in interpreting
statutes. He Argues that the Court should rely instead in most cases on a statute’s
‘plain meaning,’ derived from an ordinary understanding of the words and
structure of statutory text.” Bradley C. Karkkainen, Plain Meaning: Justice
Scalia’s Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 401, 401 (1994).
85
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743.
86
Id. at 735.
83
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fall under the CWA, a water or wetland must possess a “‘significant
nexus’ to waters that are or were navigable in fact or that could
reasonably be so made.”87 The significant nexus test is important, as
it also supports a hydrological connection theory.
Dissenting were Justices Souter, Ginsberg, Stevens, and
Breyer, who took a more holistic approach to the problem.
[T]he Corps has concluded that such wetlands play
important roles in maintaining the quality of their
adjacent waters . . . and consequently in the waters
downstream. Among other things, wetlands can offer
“nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites for
aquatic or land species”; “serve as valuable storage
areas for storm and flood waters”; and provide “significant water purification functions.” . . . [C]oncerns
about the appropriateness of the Corps’ 30-year
implementation of the Clean Water Act should be
addressed to Congress or the Corps rather than to the
Judiciary. Whether the benefits of particular conservation measures outweigh their costs is a classic
question of public policy that should not be answered
by appointed judges.88
Here, the Justices first assert that, according to the Corps, a hydrological connection theory is valid because the health of wetlands
determines the health of all WOTUS.89 They approach the situation
by considering the environment as falling squarely within WOTUS
under the Act. The health of aquatic animals, keeping pollutants out
of adjacent waters via a hydrological connection, and factors that
change water levels are all taken into account. They argue for
reducing downstream flows of pollutants. And finally, they argue
that the Executive Branch has the power to reasonably interpret the
87

Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 796, 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89
See id. at 788.
88
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CWA to make it clear to the courts what WOTUS means, so as to
clear up the confusion that not only district courts, but the Supreme
Court, had at the time about this.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
In CWA citizen suits against regulated entities, courts have
grappled with the question of whether or not groundwater defeats
CWA liability.90 The Fourth and Ninth Circuits hold that polluters
should be held liable and that a NPDES permit is required.91 These
Circuits apply the hydrological connection theory, a logical and
scientific approach. In contrast, the Sixth Circuit rejects the
hydrological connection theory, opening up a loophole for polluters
to abuse.92 Passage of a pollutant through groundwater should not
allow dischargers to escape liability, because water is hydrologically
connected. And, as shown by the interpretations of the CWA by the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits, excluding pollution to surface waters that
passes through groundwater is not explicitly excluded by the Act.
A. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits: Holding That a Trip
Through Groundwater Does Not Defeat CWA Liability
The Fourth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit hold that a trip
through groundwater does not defeat liability under the CWA. To
reach this holding, these circuits focus their analyses on the language of 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12), which defines the “discharge of a
pollutant” as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from

90

Clean Water Act Coverage of “Discharges of Pollutants” via a Direct Hydrologic Connection to Surface Water, 83 Fed. Reg. 7,126, 7,127-28 (Feb. 20, 2018)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122).
91
See, e.g., Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d
637, 641 (4th Cir. 2018); Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui (Haw. Wildlife
Fund II), 881 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 2018).
92
See, e.g., Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth. (Tenn. Clean
Water Network I), 273 F. Supp. 3d 775, 836, 842 (M.D. Tenn. 2017).
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any point source.”93 There is nothing in this language to specify that
if a pollutant travels through groundwater first, but ends up in
navigable waters, liability is defeated. While these circuits interpret
this language broadly, the language of this part of the statute has
been a point of controversy for decades among the lower courts.
This paper argues that this interpretation is proper due to the
hydrological connectivity of water bodies.
In Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P.,
the Fourth Circuit in 2018 held that a trip through groundwater does
not defeat liability under the CWA.94 In late 2014, “several hundred
thousand gallons of gasoline spilled from a rupture in a pipeline
owned by . . . Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, LP . . near Belton,
South Carolina.”95 The gasoline seeped into nearby waterways, and
the plaintiffs96 alleged “that the gasoline has continued to travel a
distance of 1000 feet or less from the pipeline to those navigable
waters.”97 This case required the court to analyze CWA liability
when the source of the pollution, a pipeline, “is no longer releasing
the pollutant, but the pollutant allegedly is passing a short distance
through the earth via ground water and is being discharged into
surface waterways.”98
The court noted that citizens can bring suit under the CWA
for discharges of pollutants that derive from a point source and
continued to be added to navigable waters.99 The Upstate Forever
court concluded that the plaintiffs stated a valid claim for a discharge of a pollutant that passed through groundwater under the

93

See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12); Joseph Manning, Running Clean: Discharges to
Groundwater Hydrologically Connected to Navigable Waters as a Means for
Asserting Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, 61 B.C. L. REV. II.-1, II.-11 to II.13
(2020).
94
Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 647–48.
95
Id. at 641.
96
Two non-profit environmental conservation groups: Upstate Forever and Savannah Riverkeeper.
97
Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 641.
98
Id.
99
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).

96
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CWA.100 Judge Keenan wrote that “CWA’s language does not
require that the point source continue to release a pollutant for a violation to be ongoing. The CWA requires only that there be an
ongoing ‘addition . . . to navigable waters,’ regardless whether a
defendant’s conduct causing the violation is ongoing.”101 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the Act clearly defines
“discharge of a pollutant” and “point source” but is vague in its
definition of “navigable waters.”102 Therefore, for clarity, the court
refers to the Supreme Court interpretation of “navigable waters”
from Rapanos v. United States, which added a broader scope to
what waters are included under “navigable waters.”103
By using the language of the CWA, the court found that
“Kinder Morgan’s gasoline pipeline unambiguously qualifie[d] as a
point source.”104 In analyzing if the defendant was liable for discharging the pollutant from a point source into navigable waters, the
court found that the CWA is not limited to discharges of pollutants
“directly” from the point source to navigable waters, as long as
pollutants continue to be “added” to navigable waters.105 In keeping
with the holding in Rapanos that broadened the scope of navigable
waters, the court found that the defendants were liable under the
CWA because the pollutants reached navigable waters.106 The
defendants cited Fifth Circuit cases in which the polluters were
found not liable, including Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical
Co.107 However, the court differentiated the facts between Hamker
and the current case, noting that in Hamker, the complaint only held
allegations of a discharge of oil into groundwater from the defen100

Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 652–53 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)).
Id. at 648.
102
See id.; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
103
See generally Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality
opinion) (observing that navigable waters include more than traditionally
navigable waters and may include certain wetlands).
104
Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 647.
105
Id. at 647–48 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12))
106
Id. at 652.
107
Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).
101
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dant’s pipe, and the pollutants never reached navigable waters.108
Applying Justice Scalia’s writings in Rapanos, the court concluded
that liability was not defeated in this case.109
In 2018, in the Hawaii Wildlife Fund case, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision holding the County of Maui
liable under the CWA.110 The County of Maui appealed the district
court’s summary judgment rulings finding lability under the CWA
when it discharged pollutants from its wells into the Pacific
Ocean.111 The county did not deny that the effluent reaches the
ocean, but it argued that it did not require a NPDES because the
point source of the pollution does not directly touch the ocean.112
The court did not agree with the county, because a party violates the
CWA when it does not obtain such a permit and “(1) discharge[s]
(2) a pollutant (3) to navigable waters (4) from a point source.”113
In determining if a trip through groundwater defeated liability, the court noted “we assume without deciding the groundwater
here is neither a point source nor a navigable water under the
CWA.”114 However, “in fidelity to the statute,” the court wanted to
reinforce that the Act “regulates point source discharges to a

108

Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 649; Hamker, 756 F.2d at 397.
Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 649–50.
110
Haw. Wildlife Fund III, 886 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir. 2018).
111
Id. at 741–42.
112
“The County contends . . . that under the CWA, it is not sufficient to focus
exclusively on the original pollutant source to determine whether an NPDES
permit is needed and that how pollutants travel from the original point source to
navigable waters matters. More specifically, the County contends the point source
itself must convey the pollutants directly into the navigable water under the CWA.
As the wells here discharge into groundwater, and then indirectly into the Pacific
Ocean, the County asserts they do not come within the ambit of the statute.” Id. at
745-46.
113
Id. at 744 (citing Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 532
(9th Cir. 2001)).
114
Id. at 746 n.2.
109
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navigable water, and that liability may attach when a point source
discharge is conveyed to a navigable water through groundwater.”115
Thus, according to the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, as long as
there is evidence connecting the pollution from the point source to
the navigable waters, a trip through groundwater did not defeat
liability.116 These circuits applied a logical analysis of the language
of the CWA to reach this conclusion. This interpretation supports a
hydrological connection theory, because a pollutant might reach
navigable waters through groundwater.117
B. The Sixth Circuit: Holding That a Point Source Must
Connect Directly to Navigable Waters Under the CWA
The Sixth Circuit differs in its interpretation of the CWA,118
and holds that the addition of any pollutant “to” navigable waters
“from” any point source means that there must be a direct connection between the point source and the navigable waters. It rejects the
hydrological connection theory, and therefore mistakenly rejects the
holding in Rapanos.119 Now that Hawaii Wildlife Fund has been
decided, it will be interesting to see if the Sixth Circuit applies the
functional equivalent test in future cases.
In 2018 in Tennessee Clean Water Network v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision of the

115

Id.; “If the point of emission is readily identified, and the transmission path to
the ocean is clearly ascertainable, the discharge is functionally one into navigable
water.” Haw. Wildlife Fund I, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 998 (D. Haw. 2014).
116
See, e.g., Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 272 (5th Cir. 2001)
(where the Fifth Circuit required some evidence of a link between discharges and
contamination of navigable waters).
117
See generally Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 743 (2006) (plurality
opinion) (the “hydrological connection theory” is premised on the holding that the
CWA’s definition of a discharge of a pollutant does not require a discharge
directly into navigable waters).
118
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
119
See supra text accompanying notes 85–88.
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district court.120 The court held that CWA jurisdiction requires
pollutants to be discharged directly from a point source into a navigable body of water, thus allowing dischargers of pollutants to
escape liability under the Act if the pollutants first travel though
some amount of groundwater.121 The court referenced another Sixth
Circuit decision, Kentucky Waterways All. v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,
which also held that groundwater was not a “point source” subject to
CWA regulation.122
The Sixth Circuit interprets the CWA to mean that the Act
requires “two things in order for pollution to qualify as a ‘discharge
of a pollutant’: (1) the pollutant must make its way to a navigable
water (2) by virtue of a point-source conveyance.”123 It argues that
groundwater is not a point source, so “when the pollutants are discharged” to navigable waters (in this case, a river), “they are not
coming from a point source; they are coming from groundwater
which is a nonpoint-source conveyance.”124
The Sixth Circuit’s position is the very definition of finding
a loophole in a statute and exploiting it. In his dissent, Judge Clay
poses the question, “can a polluter escape liability under the CWA . .
. by moving its drainage pipes a few feet from the riverbank?”125 It
would seem that in some parts of America, yes, they can. Clay states
this is “contrary to the plain text and history of the CWA.”126
Until the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Tennessee Clean Water
Network, no other circuit had interpreted the CWA to mean a trip
through groundwater defeats CWA liability.127 The pollutant that
120

“The district court had found that TVA had violated the CWA because its coal
ash ponds at the Gallatin plant leaks pollutants through groundwater that is
‘hydrologically connected’ to the Cumberland River without a permit.” Tenn.
Clean Water Network II, 273 F.3d 436, 438 (6th Cir. 2018).
121
Id. at 444.
122
Id. at 438 (citing Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utils. Co., 905 F.3d 925 (6th Cir.
2018)).
123
Id. at 444 (quoting Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 934).
124
Id.
125
Id. at 447–48 (Clay, J., dissenting).
126
Id. at 448.
127
Id.
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was the subject of Tennessee Clean Water Network was coal combustion residual (CCR), the various types of ash produced during the
burning of coal.128 CCR contains heavy metals, some of which are
carcinogenic, including mercury, cadmium, and arsenic.129 Under
the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation, a discharger doesn’t need an
NPDES permit to dump this toxic waste into water. The decision
came after the Trump EPA set forth its guidelines in 2017.
IV. THE HYDROLOGICAL CONNECTION THEORY
Water is one connected resource.130 The hydrological connection theory argues that water is all connected and a pollutant that
enters one body of water, such as a wetland, could very well seep
into groundwater before it reaches WOTUS.
[T]he importance of considering groundwater and
surface water as a single resource has become
increasingly evident. Issues related to water supply,
water quality, and degradation of aquatic environments are reported on frequently. The interaction of
groundwater and surface water has been shown to be
a significant concern in many of these issues. For
example, contaminated aquifers that discharge to
streams can result in long-term contamination of
surface water; conversely, streams can be a major
source of contamination to aquifers. Surface water
commonly is hydraulically connected to groundwater, but the interactions are difficult to observe and
128

“In 2015, EPA finalized national regulations to provide a comprehensive set of
requirements for the safe disposal of CCRs, commonly known as coal ash, from
coal-fired power plants.” Frequent Questions About the 2015 Coal Ash Disposal
Rule, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/coalash/frequent-questions-about-2015-coal-ashdisposal-rule (last visited May 15, 2020).
129
Id.
130
Water as One Resource: How Interactions Between Groundwater and Surface
Water Impact Water Availability, AGI (July 13, 2015), https://www.american
geosciences.org/ webinars/water-as-one-resource.
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measure and commonly have been ignored in watermanagement considerations and policies. Many
natural processes and human activities affect the
interactions of groundwater and surface water.131
According to a United States Geological Survey, groundwater and
surface water are hydrologically connected and are one natural
resource.132 The health of humans, animals, birds, and fish, as well
as plants, are at risk if pollutants enter any water in a level that
violates safety levels. Therefore, it is prudent and logical to require
any company, developer, industry, or individual who is dumping
pollutants to require an EPA permit.
Requiring an NPDES permit for a broader definition of
WOTUS does not over-criminalize polluters, nor does it step on
State authority. This Section examines the arguments set forth by
the Ninth, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits, argues that the interpretation
of the CWA by the Ninth and Fourth Circuits are valid, and that the
interpretation by the Sixth Circuit is highly flawed. This section also
looks more closely at the plurality decision in Rapanos, showing
similarities and differences to the Hawaii Wildlife Fund case, and
concludes that the courts should apply the science-based hydrological connection theory in these cases.
The Hawaii Wildlife Fund case was decided in a time when
the EPA was under the guidance of an oil industry lobbyist.133 The
131

T.C. WINTER ET AL., GROUND WATER AND SURFACE WATER A SINGLE
RESOURCE 1 (1998), https://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/circ1139/pdf/circ1139.pdf.
132
Id.
133
The Trump EPA rolled back the CWR under the direction of President
Trump’s first EPA administrator, Scott Pruitt, former Oklahoma Attorney General,
where he founded the “first federalism unit to combat unwarranted regulation and
overreach by the federal government.” Administrator Scott Pruitt, EPA, https://
archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/administrator-scott-pruitt.html (last visited May 15,
2020). “Pruitt has collected at least $345,246 in campaign contributions from the
oil and gas industry since 2002. . . . Pruitt raised $282,111 from oil and gas
interests over four state campaigns.” Scott Pruitt, DESMOG, https://www.desmog
blog.com/scott-pruitt (last visited May 15, 2020). Pruitt resigned in July 2018,
amid a series of scandals. Id. As of the date Hawaii Wildlife Fund was decided, the
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Supreme Court will usually look to the current EPA for guidance if
there is an unclear meaning under a Congressional statute. Under
Chevron, courts are told to determine if the Administration’s
interpretation is permissible under the statute:
If . . . the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court
does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.134
The “agency” referenced here is the EPA, and its most current
answer to questions about what constitutes WOTUS is the interpretation under the Trump administration. In rolling back the 2015
Obama-era rule in an executive order, the current administration
claimed it was “simplifying” things, and eliminating the “regulatory
patchwork” that has confused the country for decades.135
Under the final “Step 2” rule, four clear categories of
waters are currently federally regulated:

current Administrator of the EPA is former coal lobbyist, Andrew Wheeler.
Sophie Tatum, A Former Coal Lobbyist is the New Leader of the EPA, CNN (July
5, 2018, 7:00 PM), www.cnn.com/2018/07/05/politics/andrew-wheeler-epa/
index.html.
134
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(footnotes omitted).
135
EPA, U.S. Army Repeal 2015 Rule Defining “Waters of the United States”
Ending Regulatory Patchwork, EPA (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/
newsreleases/epa-us-army-repeal-2015-rule-defining-waters-united-states-endingregulatory-patchwork.
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The territorial seas and traditional navigable
waters,
Perennial and intermittent tributaries to those
waters,
Certain lakes, ponds, and impoundments, and
Wetlands adjacent to jurisdictional waters

The final rule also details twelve categories of exclusions, features that are not “waters of the United
States,” such as features that only contain water in
direct response to rainfall (e.g., ephemeral features);
groundwater; many ditches; prior converted cropland; and waste treatment systems.136
This is the Executive Agency interpretation of the CWA that the
current Supreme Court may have looked to when deciding Hawaii
Wildlife Fund in 2020.
Currently, waters are more vulnerable than ever. The EPA
limits the scope of federal jurisdiction. The Hawaii Wildlife Fund
decision sided with environmentalists but leaves lower courts with a
new question, namely, what kind of “functional equivalent” test will
be satisfied to require a discharger of pollution to require a
permit?137
Looking at the reasoning of Fourth and Ninth Circuits, there
is a clear, logical answer: the hydrological connection theory.
According to the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, as long as there is
evidence connecting the pollution from the point source to the
navigable waters, a trip through groundwater did not defeat liabil-

136

Supra The Navigable Waters Protection Rule (Step Two) – Revise, note 13.
Under the “functional equivalent” test, the Clean Water Act prohibits
unpermitted discharge of pollution “into navigable waters, or when the discharge
reaches the same result through roughly similar means.” The Clean Water Case of
the Century, EARTHJUSTICE, https://www.earthjustice.org/features/supreme-courtmaui-clean-water-case (Apr. 23, 2020).
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ity.138 By applying this to the plain language of the statute, the intent
of the CWA, which is to protect the nation’s waters, is intact. The
Second Circuit has reached a similar conclusion, reasoning that
when pollutants traveled briefly through fields or air before reaching
navigable waters, dischargers were still liable under the CWA.139
Applying the plain meaning interpretation by Justice Scalia
in Rapanos to the Hawaii Wildlife Fund case raises some interesting
points favoring of the hydrological connection theory. Scalia wrote
“the CWA does not forbid the ‘addition of any pollutant directly to
navigable waters from any point source,’ but rather the addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters.’”140 Technically, under a plain
meaning interpretation of the CWA (including under the Trump
EPA interpretation), it is correct that the specific discharge “point
source” is separate from “groundwater.” Water, however, has a hard
time separating itself between a point source, groundwater, and
navigable waters, because water is hydrologically connected.
It is illogical to not hold a discharger accountable if the
pollution ends up in groundwater and then federally regulated
waters, such as a river or the ocean, where people boat, fish, and
swim, and various flora and fauna exist in a delicate ecosystem.
Water flows, and it is all connected. Scalia, in interpreting the
statute, agreed with a hydrological connection theory.141 The Hawaii
Wildlife Fund case is no different—there is a hydrological connection between the point source of the pollution (the effluent storage),
the groundwater, and the Pacific Ocean.
The Sixth Circuit in Tennessee Clean Water Network
disregarded Scalia’s plain meaning interpretation of the CWA in

138

See, e.g., Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 272 (5th Cir. 2001)
(where the Fifth Circuit required some evidence of a link between discharges and
contamination of navigable waters).
139
See, e.g., Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d
114, 118–19 (2d Cir. 1994) (fields); Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk County,
600 F.3d 180, 188–89 (2d Cir. 2010) (air).
140
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 743 (2006) (plurality opinion).
141
See id.
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Rapanos and opened a gaping loophole for polluters.142 Recall
Judge Clay’s dissent in Tennessee Clean Water Network, when he
expressed concern that the majority’s conclusion is contrary to the
plain text and history of the CWA, allowing polluters to escape
CWA liability by reducing the length of their outflow pipe so that
pollution travels a few feet through soil before entering a navigable
body of water.143 The Sixth Circuit interpreted “any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source” too literally,
requiring that the discharge be directly connected to the navigable
waterway.144
V. THE HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND DECISION AND
THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT TEST
The Supreme Court has the authority to reject an agency
interpretation of a Congressional Statute if the agency interpretation
modifies what Congress made mandatory.145 In County of Maui v.
Hawaii Wildlife Fund,146 the Supreme Court did not completely
reject the Trump Administration’s EPA interpretation of the CWA,
but it did side with environmentalists. The Court uses a “functional
equivalent” theory test to determine liability in Hawaii Wildlife
Fund.147 This is not a bright-line rule but instead allows for interpretation on a case-by-case basis.
Groundwater connects hydrologically to jurisdictional
surface waters, and it is, therefore, difficult to determine if pollutants
traveled a few miles in groundwater, a few feet, or not at all.148 This
is a proximity issue, which the Supreme Court attempted to resolve
in Hawaii Wildlife Fund with a “functional equivalent” test.149 The
142

Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 905 F.3d 436, 449 (6th Cir.
2018) (Clay, J., dissenting).
143
Id. at 447–48 (Clay, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 444 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)).
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case looks at Congress’s intent when, in the CWA, Congress defined
“discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”150
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, which held
that the CWA requires a permit when there is a direct discharge
from a point source into navigable waters, or when there is the
functional equivalent of a direct discharge.151 Justice Kavanaugh
filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed dissenting opinion,
in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting
opinion.
The “functional equivalent” theory is a vague interpretation
and sets no specific guidelines:
Many factors may be relevant to determining
whether a particular discharge is the functional
equivalent of one directly into navigable waters.
Time and distance will be the most important
factors in most cases, but other relevant factors may
include, e.g., the nature of the material through
which the pollutant travels and the extent to which
the pollutant is diluted or chemically changed as it
travels. Courts will provide additional guidance
through decisions in individual cases. The underlying statutory objectives can also provide guidance,
and EPA can provide administrative guidance.
Although this interpretation does not present as
clear a line as the other interpretations proffered, the
EPA has applied the permitting provision to some
discharges through groundwater for over 30 years,
with no evidence of inadministrability or an unmanageable expansion in the statute’s scope.152

150

33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
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Factors include time, distance, the nature of the material, and perhaps others as well. This provides almost no guidance whatsoever.
A “functional equivalent” test will mean that lower courts will
continue to have to analyze facts on a case-by-case basis.
However, the Court did have some strong words about the
Solicitor General’s argument and the recent EPA’s interpretation of
the CWA,153 which is that “all releases of pollutants to groundwater
are excluded from the scope of the [permitting] program, even
where pollutants are conveyed to jurisdictional surface waters via
groundwater.”154 The Court held that this reading of the EPA’s
recent Interpretive Statement would “open a loophole allowing easy
evasion of the statutory provision’s basic purposes” and is “neither
persuasive nor reasonable.”155 The Court struggles with completely
rejecting the recent EPA interpretation because the intent of Congress in writing the CWA was to “provide federal regulation of
identifiable sources of pollutants entering navigable waters without
undermining the States’ longstanding regulatory authority over land
and groundwater.”156 Therefore, the majority reaches a place of a
happy medium with the functional equivalent theory.
A ruling for the County of Maui would have been devastating to the nation’s waters, to human health, and to an already fragile
ecosystem. However, without a bright-line rule for courts to follow,
more litigation will ensue.157 Since it is beyond the scope of the
judicial branch to rewrite the CWA, it is clear that Congress needs to
expand the scope of the Act to better match the Obama-era CWR.
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Id. at 1474. The United States supports Maui, at least in respect to groundwater.
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Haw.
Wildlife Fund V, 140 S.Ct. 1462 (2020) (No.18-260), 2019 WL 2153160.
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Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
155, at 7.
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Wildlife Fund V, 140 S. Ct. at 1474.
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Id. at 1476.
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The Court admits “[t]he difficulty with this approach [recognizing] that it does
not, on its own, clearly explain how to deal with middle instances. But there are
too many potentially relevant factors applicable to factually different cases for this
Court now to use more specific language.” Id.
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VI. WHAT COMES AFTER HAWAII
Jean Malaurie writes, “Men of science, like men of state
have a duty imposed by ethics. The Earth is living: it can and will
avenge itself: already there are portents. The Earth has no time left
for man’s ignorance, arrogance, sophistry and madness.”158 Surely
the portents before us can no longer be ignored for the sake of coal
and oil lobbyists on Capitol Hill. Perhaps not as obvious as a river
on fire, the signs are here. Recall that beach in Hawaii where you
were spending your imaginary honeymoon, it is a real beach, and it
is being flooded with pollution from a sewage treatment plant every
day.
Not only will courts have to determine what constitutes a
hydrological connection or a significant nexus on a case-by-case
basis, but states are also confused as to how to regulate water interconnectivity. Within one week of the Supreme Court decision in
Hawaii Wildlife Fund, a coalition of 17 states sued the Trump
administration for rolling back Obama-era protections for waterways, arguing the move ignores science on the interconnectivity of
water.159
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Cyril Christo, Coronavirus Should Be a Wake-Up Call to Our Treatment of the
Animal World, CHANGING AM. (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.thehill.com/
changing-america/opinion/488295-coronavirus-should-be-a-wake-up-call-to-ourtreatment-of-the-animal (quoting Jean Malaurie). “Professor Jean Malaurie was
designated UNESCO Goodwill Ambassador in July 2007, in recognition of his
commitment to environmental issues, as well as safeguarding the cultures and
knowledge of the peoples of the Far North” Jean Malaurie, UNESCO, http://
www.unesco.org/new/en/goodwill-ambassadors/jean-malaurie/
[http://web.
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An estimated 300,000 federal regulations are now subject to
criminal enforcement.160 However, something as simple as requiring
that companies get an NPDES permit to pollute our groundwater
that connects to surface waters is a controversial subject that has
changed drastically between the Obama and Trump administrations.
The hydrological connection theory is the most simple and logical
way to regulate water pollution. This is not an overcriminalization of
polluters. This is not Federal overreach. It is a simple, accurate,
interpretation of the language and intent of the CWA that ensures
the safety of our nation’s waters.
By making it a federal crime to dump pollutants into groundwater that ends up in navigable waters, many companies and industries will be feeling the pressure. Federal crimes are highly visible,
and environmental crimes generally threaten not only waters and the
environment but human beings and the public. Undoubtedly,
companies want to avoid any kind of stigma that goes along with a
criminal conviction for a federal environmental crime.161 However,
there are oil and coal lobbyists working in the EPA, continually
rolling back rules that protect the nation’s water.162
Whether Congress will amend the CWA to incorporate the
hydrological connection theory is unknown. What is clear is that we
must urge a uniform interpretation in the courts to protect our
country’s waters and hold polluters accountable, the Hawaii Wildlife
Fund decision did not offer enough guidance to resolve the circuit
split. Administrations come and go. However, as the saying goes,
“there is only one planet Earth,” and it is our duty to fight for justice
160

John Malcom & Michael B. Mukasey, The Importance of Meaningful Mens
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GEO. L.J. 2407, 2441–45 (1995) (discussing the “aims and identifying features of
criminal law”).
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See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed.
Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110,
112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, and 401).
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for all of its inhabitants, as well as its environment. It is time to stop
muddying the waters and create more clarity for our courts and the
nation.

